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Abstract—This work deals with the power allocation problem
in a multipoint-to-multipoint network, which is heterogenous in
the sense that each transmit and receiver pair can arbitrarily
choose whether to selfishly maximize its own rate or energy
efficiency. This is achieved by modeling the transmit and receiver
pairs as rational players that engage in a non-cooperative
game in which the utility function changes according to each
player’s nature. The underlying game is reformulated as a quasi
variational inequality (QVI) problem using convex fractional
program theory. The equivalence between the QVI and the non-
cooperative game provides us with all the mathematical tools
to study the uniqueness of its Nash equilibrium points and to
derive novel algorithms that allow the network to converge to
these points in an iterative manner, both with and without the
need for a centralized processing. Numerical results are used to
validate the proposed solutions in different operating conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The vision of seamless and pervasive wireless communica-
tion systems has paved the way to an extraordinary prolifer-
ation of wireless network infrastructures and ubiquitous ser-
vices [1]. In this challenging arena, we consider a multipoint-
to-multipoint network in which each transmit and receiver pair
(TRP) can arbitrarily choose whether to selfishly maximize its
own spectral efficiency (SE) (in terms of maximum achievable
rate), or its own energy efficiency (EE) (in terms of trading
off achievable rate and energy consumption). An example in
which this heterogeneous multitude of users interact with each
other might be represented by small-cell networks, which are
founded on the idea of multiple radio access technologies,
architectures and transmission techniques coexisting in the
same area to ensure the most efficient usage of the spectrum
resource with the minimum waste of energy [2].
Despite its promises, the deployment of small-cell networks
poses several technical challenges mainly because different
small cells are likely to be connected via an unreliable back-
haul infrastructure whose features may strongly vary from case
to case, with variable characteristics of error rate, delay, and
capacity. This calls for developing flexible and decentralized
power allocation strategies relying on local channel state infor-
mation, and requiring only a small exchange of information.
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A. Related works
As is well-known, a suitable tool to study and design
complex interactions among rational entities operating in a
distributed manner is game theory. In recent years, there has
been a growing interest in adopting game theory to model
many communications and networking problems (a good sur-
vey of the results on this topic can be found in [3]). Among
the early contributions in this area, it is worth mentioning [4]–
[6], in which the rate maximization problem for autonomous
digital subscriber lines is addressed following a competitive
optimality criterion. Following the route of such early works,
most existing literature in wireless communications is focused
on developing power control techniques for the maximiza-
tion of the individual SE while satisfying individual power
constraints. Some examples in the area of non-cooperative
game theory are represented by the distributed power con-
trol strategies proposed in [7] for multi-user multiple-input
multiple-output systems and by those developed in [8] and [9]
for interference relay channels, whereas a two-tier network is
considered in [10]. In [11], [12], the authors propose a detailed
analysis of the Nash equilibrium (NE) point for the rate
maximization problem in parallel Gaussian multiple access
channels in which mobile users autonomously take decisions
on the resource usage and compete with each other to exploit
the available resources. More recently, in [13] the authors
rely on the variational inequality (VI) framework to model
and analyze the competitive rate maximization problem. The
analogy between NE problems and VIs is also exploited in
[14] to design distributed power control algorithms for rate
maximization under interference temperature constraints in a
cognitive radio context.
All the aforementioned distributed power allocation strate-
gies have the great advantage of avoiding the excessive in-
formation exchange to achieve signal coordination as well as
involved computational processing [13]. On the other hand,
users’ aggressive attitude towards interference can lead to
a large transmission power at the mobile stations, thereby
fostering an inefficient use of batteries. All this makes such
existing solutions not suited for the development of energy-
efficient networks. This has motivated a great interest in
studying and designing resource allocation schemes taking
into account the cost of energy in the performance metrics.
Towards this end, the concept of link capacity per unit cost
originally proposed by Verdu´ in [15] has been widely adopted
in many different contexts (e.g., see [16]–[19] and references
therein). In [19], [20], the authors focus on the same scenario
investigated in [11], [12] and study the NE problem for a
group of players aiming at maximizing their own EE while
satisfying power constraints or rate requirements. Although
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2interesting, the theoretical framework developed in [19], [20]
does not provide a systematic study of the relationship between
the SE and the EE maximization problems. To the best of our
knowledge, a unified framework accommodating both is still
missing.
B. Contributions
The aim of this paper is to fulfill the gap mentioned above
using the quasi VI (QVI) framework, originally introduced
by Bensoussan in [21] as a modeling tool to be used in
different fields such as economics and biology (see also [22]
and references therein). Unlike the traditional VI framework,
that has been widely applied in wireless communications, the
use of QVI theory to develop numerical algorithms is relatively
recent [23]. In this work, we apply the QVI to study the
solution properties of power allocation in a heterogeneous
game defined as non-cooperative game in which the users
can locally choose whether to pursue their own SE or their
own EE. This allows us to overcome the main limitations
of existing approaches, which fail to provide closed-form
conditions on the uniqueness of the equilibrium points and
on the convergence properties of iterative solutions. Towards
this goal, a two-step approach is used. First, the EE maxi-
mization problem introduced in [19] is reformulated as a QVI
using convex fractional programming theory [17]. The same
approach is then exploited to reformulate the heterogeneous
game as a QVI. This is per-se sufficient to elaborate some
insights on the properties of the NE points and to provide
us with all the mathematical tools to study the uniqueness of
the NE points of the heterogeneous game, and the convergence
properties of iterative algorithms. In particular, we first propose
a centralized approach, which relies on an iterative method
for solving QVIs whose convergence is guaranteed under
mild assumptions. Then, we propose an alternative solution
exploiting the equivalence between the QVI and a nonlinear
complementary problem (NCP), which gives each TRP the
possibility to reach the NE in a distributed manner without the
need for any centralized processing. The developed solutions
are then validated by means of extensive simulations.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the signal model, some basic no-
tations and the problem under investigation. We also review
the available literature on both the SE-only and the EE-
only maximization problems, with particular emphasis on the
major limitations of classical approaches when studying the
EE problem. Section III illustrates the mathematical steps to
reformulate the EE-only game as a QVI. This approach is
then used in Section III-B to formalize the heterogeneous
game in which both SE and EE users coexist. The uniqueness
conditions for the NE points of the heterogeneous game are
studied in Section IV. The QVI framework is also used in
Section V to derive and study the convergence properties of
two different iterative algorithms for achieving the NE points.
Numerical results are shown in Section VI whereas some
concluding remarks and discussions are drawn in Section VII.
D. Notation
The following notation is used throughout the paper. Matri-
ces and vectors are denoted by boldface letters. The notation
[A]i,k is used to indicate the (i, k)th entry of the enclosed
matrix A, and A = diag{a(n) ; n = 1, 2, . . . , N} denotes
an N × N diagonal matrix with entries a(n) along its main
diagonal.
∏
i Xi denotes the Cartesian product of the sets Xi,
and ≽ stands for the element-wise greater or equal relations.
1N and 0N are theN -dimensional all-one and all-zero vectors,
respectively. ∥x∥ denotes the Euclidean norm of vector x, and
∥A∥ denotes the induced norm of matrix A. The notation
x⊥y stands for xTy = 0 and ∇xf(x,y) denotes the gradient
vector of f(x,y) with respect to x. In addition, λmax(A) and
λmin(A) denote respectively the maximum and the minimum
eigenvalue of matrix A. Finally, Kk denotes the indicator
function of a set K and it is such that Kk = 1 if k ∈ K
and zero otherwise while [x]+ = max (0, x).
II. NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS
Consider a K-user N -parallel Gaussian interference chan-
nel, in which there are K TRPs sharing N parallel Gaussian
subchannels, that might represent time or frequency bins. The
channel transfer function over the nth subchannel between
the transmitter i and receiver k is denoted by Hk,i(n). The
transmission strategy of each user k is the power allocation
vector pk = [pk(1), pk(2), . . . , pk(N)]T over the N subchan-
nels satisfying the following (local) transmit power constraints:
Pk =
{
pk ∈ RN+ : hk (pk) ≤ 0
}
(1)
where hk (pk) is an affine function of pk given by
hk (pk) = 1
Tpk − Pk (2)
with Pk being the total power available at transmitter k. We
assume that the K TRPs do not cooperate with each other and
that the multi-user interference is simply treated as additive
colored noise at each receiver. Moreover, local perfect channel
state information is available at both transmitter and receiver
sides.
In the above circumstances, the maximum achievable rate
on link k for a specific power allocation profile p =
[pT1 ,p
T
2 , . . . ,p
T
K ]
T is given by
Rk(pk,p−k) =
N∑
n=1
log
⎛⎜⎝1 + |Hk,k(n)|2 pk(n)
σ2k(n) +
∑
i̸=k
|Hk,i(n)|2 pi(n)
⎞⎟⎠
(3)
where σ2k(n) is the noise variance over the nth subcarrier
on link k and p−k = [pT1 ,p
T
2 , . . . ,p
T
k−1,p
T
k+1, . . . ,p
T
K ]
T
collects the power allocation vectors of all transmitters, except
the kth one. Following [16]–[19], the EE Ek(pk,p−k) of the
kth link can be computed as
Ek(pk,p−k) =
Rk(pk,p−k)
Ψk + 1Tpk
(4)
with Ψk > 0 being the radio frequency (RF) circuitry power
consumed at transmitter k.
As mentioned earlier, one of the major objectives of this
work is to provide a framework to study heterogeneous multi-
user systems in which each user can choose whether to
3maximize its own SE or EE. To this end, we first recall some
fundamental results for the NE problem in which each player
(the TRP) maximizes its own SE (Section II-A). Then, the
case of competitive players aiming at maximizing the EE of
the link is introduced and its NE points are mathematically
characterized (Section II-B), using a fractional programming
approach. Finally, in Section II-C we combine the results from
these two game formulations to properly formalize and study
the heterogeneous problem sketched above.
A. Rate maximization
The rate maximization problem refers to a system in which
each TRPr aims at selfishly choosing the power allocation
strategy that maximizes its own rate for a given set of other
players’ power profile. Mathematically, this amounts to jointly
solving the following problems:
max
pk
Rk(pk,p−k) ∀k (5)
subject to pk ∈ Pk.
As is known, the joint solution of (5) p⋆ = [p⋆1, . . . ,p⋆K ] =
[p⋆k,p
⋆
−k], such that p
⋆
k = arg maxpk∈Pk Rk(pk,p
⋆
−k), cor-
responds to the NE of the non-cooperative game with complete
information defined as GR = ⟨K, {Pk}, {Rk}⟩ in which:
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} is the set of players; Pk denotes the
strategy set of player k, defined as in (1); and Rk is player
k’s payoff function that is the rate defined in (3).
Proposition 1 ([11]). The Nash equilibria p⋆ of GR are found
to be the fixed points of the waterfilling mappings given by
p⋆k(n) =
[
wfk(p
⋆
−k, µ
⋆
k)
]
n
(6)
where
[
wfk(p
⋆
−k, µ
⋆
k)
]
n
=
⎡⎢⎣ 1
µ⋆k
−
σ2k(n) +
∑
i̸=k
|Hk,i(n)|2 p⋆i (n)
|Hk,k(n)|2
⎤⎥⎦
+
(7)
and µ⋆k is the water level, chosen such that
1Tp⋆k = Pk. (8)
In [13], the authors provide a convenient way to study the
properties of p⋆ by showing that the rate maximization NE
problem is equivalent to the nonlinear VI VI(P ,F) in which
F(p) = {Fk(p)}Kk=1, with
Fk(p) = −∇pkRk(pk,p−k) (9)
=
⎧⎨⎩−
(
ξk(n) +
K∑
i=1
Dk,i(n)pi(n)
)−1⎫⎬⎭
N
n=1
(10)
with
ξk(n) =
σ2k(n)
|Hk,k(n)|2
and Dk,i(n) =
|Hk,i(n)|2
|Hk,k(n)|2
. (11)
Thanks to the equivalence between the NE problem and the
VI(P ,F), the following result can be proved.
Theorem 1 ([13]). A power allocation profile p⋆ ∈ P is an
NE of the rate maximization problem if and only if
(p− p⋆)T F(p⋆) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P (12)
with P =∏Kk=1 Pk.
Interestingly, [11] also shows that the NE in (6) can be
interpreted as a set of Euclidean projections onto the facets
of K polytopes. To see how this comes about, let ξk =
[ξk(1), ξk(2), . . . , ξk(N)]
T and Dk,i = diag{Dk,i(n);n =
1, 2, . . . , N}. Define also P = ∏Kk=1 Pk where each Pk is
the simplex
Pk =
{
pk ∈ RN+ : hk (pk) = 0
}
(13)
obtained from (1) when the power constraint is satisfied with
equality.
Proposition 2 ([12]). A power allocation profile p⋆ is an NE
of the rate maximization problem if and only if
p⋆k = ΠPk
⎛⎝−ξk −∑
i̸=k
Dk,ip
⋆
i
⎞⎠ ∀k (14)
where ΠPk (z) computes the vector in the simplex Pk that is
closest to z in the Euclidean norm.
One of the major advantages of reformulating the NE prob-
lem as in (14) is that the sufficient conditions for the unique-
ness of the NE of GR can be derived by simply studying the
contraction property of ΠP (z) = [ΠP1 (z1) · · ·ΠPK (zk)]T ,
where zk = −ξk −
∑
i̸=kDk,ipi, with respect to the vector
p. In addition, the analysis of the convergence of iterative
waterfilling-inspired algorithms is greatly simplified (please
refer to [12] for more details on this subject). As we shall
see, similar results can be proved to hold true for the energy-
efficient maximization problem.
B. Energy-efficiency maximization
The EE maximization problem refers to a network in
which each player k aims at selfishly choosing a power
vector pk ∈ Pk to maximize its own EE Ek(pk,p−k) for
a given set of other players’ powers p−k. The problem can be
mathematically formulated as:
max
pk
Ek(pk,p−k) =
Rk(pk,p−k)
Ψk + 1Tpk
∀k (15)
subject to pk ∈ Pk.
Analogously to what is introduced in Section II-A, the
solution of (15) is the NE of the noncooperative game GE =
⟨K, {Pk}, {Ek}⟩. Since the utility functions Ek(pk,p−k),
∀k ∈ K, are strictly quasiconcave and Pk is a convex
set, the players’ best response to the opponent strategies
can be computed using different convex optimization tools.
Although possible, this direct approach, originally pursued in
[19], presents some disadvantages, mainly because it does
not bring any insights into the structure of the equilibrium
points. This makes it hard to provide closed-form conditions
for the uniqueness of the NE points of GE and to study the
4Algorithm 1: Dinkelbach method
Data. Set i = 0 and ν(0)k = ν¯, with a random ν¯ > 0. Choose
ϵ≪ 1.
Step 1. Compute
z
(i)
k (ν
(i)
k ) = wfk(p−k, ν
(i)
k ).
Step 2. Set
ν
(i+1)
k =
Rk
(
z
(i)
k (ν
(i)
k ),p−k
)
Ψk + 1T z
(i)
k (ν
(i)
k )
.
Step 3. If the condition∣∣∣Rk (z(i)k (ν(i)k ),p−k)− ν(i+1)k (Ψk + 1T z(i)k (ν(i)k ))∣∣∣ < ϵ
is satisfied, then return ν⋆k = ν
(i+1)
k and STOP; otherwise, go
to Step 4.
Step 4. Set i← i+ 1; and go back to Step 1.
convergence properties of iterative algorithms based on best
response dynamics (see also [20]).
An alternative route (e.g., followed in [17]) relies on observ-
ing that (15) belongs to the class of concave-convex fractional
programs, since Rk(pk,p−k) is a concave function of pk
whereas Ψk+1Tpk is affine and positive. Interestingly, the so-
lution of such problems can be computed through methods that
rely on different convex reformulations or duality approaches
(see [24] for more details on this subject). Although different
in principle, all these methods are very closely related to each
other since they all lead to the same optimality condition. Fol-
lowing the parameter-free convex fractional program approach
(whose main steps are reported in Appendix A for the sake
of completeness), it turns out that player k’s best response
Bk(p−k) to an opponents’ vector p−k takes the form:
Bk(p−k) = wfk(p−k,λ⋆k(p−k)) (16)
where λ⋆k(p−k) must satisfy the condition
1TBk(p−k) = min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p−k)
−Ψk
}
. (17)
The value of 1/t⋆k(p−k) corresponds to the total (radiated
and fixed) power consumption for any given p−k when the
constraint hk (pk) ≤ 0 in (15) is neglected, and can be
computed as (see Appendix A)
t⋆k(p−k) =
1
Ψk + 1T zk(ν⋆k)
(18)
where zk(ν⋆k) is given by
zk(ν
⋆
k) = wfk(p−k, ν
⋆
k) (19)
with ν∗k being iteratively obtained via Algorithm 1 (originally
proposed by Dinkelbach in [25]) and such that
Rk (zk(ν
⋆
k),p−k)− ν⋆k
(
Ψk + 1
T zk(ν
⋆
k)
)
= 0. (20)
Using the above results, the following proposition easily
follows from the observation that a point p⋆ is an NE if and
only if p⋆ ∈ B(p⋆), with B(p) =∏Kk=1 Bk(p−k).
Proposition 3. The Nash equilibria p⋆ of GE are obtained as
the fixed-point solutions of the following waterfilling mapping:
p⋆k = Bk(p⋆−k) = wfk(p⋆−k,λ⋆k(p⋆−k)) (21)
with λ⋆k(p
⋆
−k) being such that
1Tp⋆k = min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p
⋆
−k)
−Ψk
}
. (22)
Remark 1. Similarly to GR, the NE points of GE are found
to be the fixed points of a waterfilling mapping, with the only
difference that the water level must be chosen so as to satisfy
(22) rather than (8).
Remark 2. Since t⋆k(p−k) plays a major role in all subsequent
discussions, let us point out its physical meaning and prop-
erties. As mentioned before, 1/t⋆k(p−k) ∈ [Ψk,∞) represents
the total power dissipation that is required to maximize the
EE for any given p−k when the constraint hk (pk) ≤ 0 is
neglected. Mathematically, t⋆k(p−k) is obtained as the tk-part
of the solution of the following optimization problem (see
Appendix A):
max
{yk,tk}∈RN+1+
tkRk(yk/tk,p−k) (23)
subject to tk(Ψk + 1
Tyk/tk) = 1.
where pk = yk/tk. From the above problem, it turns out that
1/t⋆k(p−k) − Ψk is the total radiated power that would be
needed by player k to maximize its own EE for a given p−k.
The maximum power constraint (1) acts as an upper bound to
the strategy p⋆k, as follows from (17).
It is worth observing that computing the NE as in (21),
although useful to characterize its structure, does not provide
any particular advantage in deriving conditions for the unique-
ness of the NE points of GE . Similarly, the analysis on the
convergence properties of the resulting iterative solutions is
still much open. For this reason, analogously to what was
done in [13] for the rate maximization game using the VI
approach, in Section III we will make use of the above results
to reformulate GE as a QVI to exploit the powerful tools
provided by the QVI theory. Before delving into this, we
briefly introduce the heterogeneous maximization problem that
will be analyzed in Section III-B.
C. Heterogeneous maximization
Consider now a heterogeneous scenario in which a set KR
of players follows a rate maximization strategy, while the
remaining set KE is interested in maximizing its own EE.
Let us define G = ⟨K, {Pk}, {uk}⟩ the corresponding game
in which: K = KR ∪ KE is the set collecting both types of
users; the strategy set Pk is defined as in (1); and uk(pk,p−k)
is the utility function, defined as
uk(pk,p−k) =
{
Rk(pk,p−k) if k ∈ KR
Ek(pk,p−k) if k ∈ KE .
(24)
5The problem to be solved for each player k can thus be
mathematically formalized as follows:
max
pk
uk(pk,p−k) ∀k (25)
subject to pk ∈ Pk
and the corresponding Nash equilibria are obtained as follows
using the results of Propositions 1 and 3.
Proposition 4. The Nash equilibria p⋆ of G are obtained as
the fixed-point solutions of the following waterfilling mapping:
p⋆k = wfk(p
⋆
−k,λ
⋆
k(p
⋆
−k)) (26)
with λ⋆k(p
⋆
−k) being such that the following equality holds
true:
1Tp⋆k =
⎧⎨⎩
Pk if k ∈ KR
min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p
⋆
−k)
−Ψk
}
if k ∈ KE . (27)
Similarly to the energy-efficient maximization problem,
characterizing the properties of the NE points of G, such as
uniqueness conditions, and developing iterative solutions to
achieve these points in a distributed manner, are open problems
that call for an alternative approach. As mentioned earlier, we
address all these issues by reformulating G as a QVI.
III. QVI FORMULATION OF GE
Next, we make use of the results of Section II-B to show
how GE can be reformulated as a QVI. To this end, for any
given p−k, let us introduce the function gk(pk,p−k), defined
as
gk(pk,p−k) = 1Tpk −
(
1
t⋆k(p−k)
−Ψk
)
(28)
where t⋆k(p−k) is computed through (18)-(20). Let us also
denote P−k =
∏
i̸=k Pi and
Q (p) =
K∏
k=1
Qk(p−k) (29)
where Qk : P−k → 2Pk , ∀k collects the set-valued functions
given by
Qk(p−k) = Pk ∩
{
pk ∈ RN+ : gk(pk,p−k) ≤ 0
}
(30)
whereas 2Pk is the power set collecting all the possible subsets
of Pk [26]. Then, the following result can be obtained.
Theorem 2. A power allocation profile p⋆ ∈ Q(p⋆) is an
NE of the EE maximization problem given in (15) if and only
if it solves the QVI(Q,F), where F(p) = {Fk(p)}Kk=1, and
Fk(p) is the mapping defined in (9). Stated formally, p⋆ is an
NE of GE if and only if it is such that
(p− p⋆)T F(p⋆) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Q(p⋆). (31)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B and relies on
proving that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of
QVI(Q,F) are satisfied if and only if there exists a vector
p⋆ and a suitable Lagrange multiplier λ⋆ ∈ RK+ such that
(21) and (22) hold true.
Remark 3. The results of Theorem 2 are reminiscent of those
in [14] in which the authors make use of the VI framework
to solve the rate maximization problem in a cognitive radio
network under interference constraints. In that case, the indi-
vidual strategy sets Qk(p−k), ∀k ∈ K, are defined as
Qk(p−k) = Pk ∩
{
pk ∈ RN+ : I(pk,p−k) ≤ 0
}
(32)
where I(pk,p−k) denotes the interference constraint. The
latter turns out to be the same for any link k and moreover it
is shown to be convex with respect to the entire strategy profile
p. This property allows the authors in [14] to reformulate the
rate maximization problem as a VI. A close inspection of (28)
reveals that gk(pk,p−k) depends on the index link k and it is
not jointly convex with respect to the power allocation profile
p. For this reason the VI approach adopted in [14] cannot be
applied to the problem at hand while the QVI framework is
shown to be of great help.
A. Energy-efficiency maximization as a projector
For the sake of completeness, we observe that (similarly
to what has been done for the rate maximization problem in
[11]) the NE of GE can also be interpreted as the Euclidean
projection of the vector −ξk−
∑
i̸=kDk,ipi onto the simplex
Qk(p−k) =
{
pk ∈ RN+ : max {hk(pk), gk(pk,p−k)} = 0
}
(33)
where gk(pk,p−k) = 0 is an affine hyperplane in pk for any
given p−k. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. A power allocation profile p⋆ is an NE of GE
if
p⋆k = ΠQk(p⋆−k)
⎛⎝−ξk −∑
i̸=k
Dk,ip
⋆
i
⎞⎠ . (34)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C and relies on
proving that the KKT conditions of (34) are satisfied by the
solution to (15).
Capitalizing on the interpretation of the NE point as a
Euclidean projection, a graphical comparison between the
spectral-efficient (i.e., rate-maximizing) and energy-efficient
best responses is provided in Fig. 1 for the case N = 2.
In particular, Fig. 1 shows the player k’s best response to
two different strategies of the other players, namely, p−k and
p′−k. As seen, the player k’s best responses are obtained as
the projections of the interference vectors −ξk−
∑
i̸=kDk,ipi
and −ξk−
∑
i̸=kDk,ip
′
i onto the corresponding hyperplanes:
hk(pk) = 0 for rate maximization, and gk(pk,p−k) = 0 for
energy-efficient maximization.1 In sharp contrast to hk(pk) =
0, the hyperplane gk(pk,p−k) = 0 (corresponding to the
straight lines below the grey regions) depends on the other
players’ strategies through 1/t⋆k(p−k), which varies within
the interval [Ψk,∞). It is worth observing that all admissible
power allocation profiles lie into the grey zone between the
two hyperplanes. Due to space limitations, we cannot provide
more details on this interpretation of the best response. We
just observe that it can be useful to get further insights into
1If the projection of the interference vector is outside the grey region, then
all the power is allocated only over the subchannel with the highest gain.
6Fig. 1: Graphical illustration of SE and EE best responses.
the energy-aware optimization problem and more specifically
into the trade-off between SE and EE policies in a competitive
environment. Moreover, it might turn useful in some cases to
study the convergence properties of distributed solutions as
happened for the rate maximization problem (please refer to
[12] for more details on this subject). However, this is left for
future work and not pursued further in the sequel.
B. QVI Formulation of G
Let us consider now the heterogeneous scenario. The fol-
lowing result can be proved.
Proposition 6. Let Sk denote the set given by
Sk(p−k) =
{
Pk if k ∈ KR
Qk(p−k) if k ∈ KE
(35)
and let S : P → 2P be the set-valued function defined as the
following Cartesian product:
S(p) =
∏
k∈K
Sk(p−k). (36)
Then, the NE problem in (25) is equivalent to QVI(S,F),
which equals to finding a vector p⋆ such that
(p− p⋆)T F(p⋆) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ S(p⋆) (37)
where F : RNK → RNK is obtained as in (9).
Proof: The proof follows the same steps as those used
in Appendix B to prove Theorem 2. In particular, it relies
on showing that the power allocation profile pk satisfying
the KKT conditions of the QVI is also a solution of the kth
maximization problem in (25).
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIA
The existence and uniqueness of the NE points of G are
now studied.
Proposition 7. The game G admits a nonempty set of NE
points for any non-null maximum transmit power of users.
Proof: The proof follows from observing that G satisfies
the existence conditions in [27, Theorem 1.2]. In particular,
the sets Pk are nonempty, convex and closed for any non-null
maximum transmit power of users. Also, the payoff functions
Rk(pk,p−k) and Ek(pk,p−k) are both quasi-concave with
respect to pk.
As far as the uniqueness of the NE is concerned, the
following theorem provides a sufficient condition guaranteeing
the uniqueness of the power allocation vector p⋆ in (37) and
thus in (25).
Theorem 3. (Uniqueness conditions): Let Ω (·) be the map-
ping with elements given by
[Ω (p)]k =
{
Pk if k ∈ KR
1/t⋆k(p−k)−Ψk if k ∈ KE
(38)
and let us define the matrices A and B whose elements are
[A]k,i = max
n
{
|Hk,i(n)|2 |Hk,k(n)|2
σ4k(n)
}
(39)
and
[B]k,i =
{
1, if i = k,
−max
n
{ |Hk,i(n)|2
|Hi,i(n)|2 ςk,i(n)
}
, if i ̸= k, (40)
with ςk,i(n) being defined as
ςk,i(n) =
σ2i (n) +
∑
ℓ |Hi,ℓ(n)|2 Pℓ
σ2k(n)
. (41)
The uniqueness of the NE in (25) is guaranteed under the
following conditions.
• The matrix B is positive definite;
• There exists a nonnegative constant δ < 1/Γ such that
∥Ω (p)−Ω (p′)∥ ≤ δ ∥p− p′∥ ∀p,p′ ∈ P (42)
where
Γ =
√
λmax(AHA)
λmin(B˜)
max
k
max
n
{
(ς˜k(n))
2
}
(43)
is the so-called condition number of F with λmax(AHA)
and λmin(B˜) being the maximum eigenvalue of AHA
and the minimum eigenvalue of the symmetric part of B,
respectively, and
ς˜k(n) =
σ2k(n)
|Hk,k(n)|2 +
∑
i
|Hk,i(n)|2
|Hk,k(n)|2Pi. (44)
7Algorithm 2: Sequential penalty approach for solving
QVI(S,F).
Data. Choose an increasing sequence {ρ(i)}∞i=0 satisfying (48),
and a sequence of vectors {α(i)}∞i=0. Set j = 0.
Step 1. Compute p(j) as the solution of the penalized VI in (49).
Step 2. If a suitable termination criterion is satisfied, then return
pSPA = p(j) and STOP, otherwise go to Step 3.
Step 3. Set j ← j + 1; and go back to Step 1.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D and relies on
[28, Theorem 4.1]. Observe that, unlike [14], the positive
definiteness of B is not sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness
of the NE point (see discussion below).
Remark 4. Observe that when KE = ∅ and thus K = KR
then (42) is always satisfied since ∥Ω (p)−Ω (p′)∥ = 0.
Therefore, the uniqueness conditions only require the matrix
B to be positive definite. Not surprisingly, this result coincides
with that in [14], wherein the authors show that the positive
definiteness of B is a sufficient condition to claim the unique-
ness of the NE for the rate maximization game. As rigorously
discussed in [14], B is positive definite if for any k one (or
both) of the following conditions is fulfilled:
1
wk
∑
i̸=k
wimax
n
{ |Hk,i(n)|2
|Hi,i(n)|2 ςk,i(n)
}
< 1 (45)
1
wi
∑
k ̸=i
wk max
n
{ |Hk,i(n)|2
|Hi,i(n)|2 ςk,i(n)
}
< 1 (46)
where w = [w1, w2, . . . , wK ]T is some positive vector. The
above inequalities say that the positive definiteness of B is
ensured if the received and/or generated multi-user interfer-
ence is relatively low [14]. On the other hand, if KE ̸= ∅
then
∥Ω (p)−Ω (p′)∥2 =
∑
k∈KE
([Ω (p)]k − [Ω (p′)]k)2 (47)
where [Ω (p)]k is the total power consumption on link k given
by (38). Therefore, the positive definiteness of B alone is no
longer sufficient since (42) is not always satisfied. A close
inspection of (42)-(43) leads to the following interpretation
of this additional condition: The game G has a unique NE if
at a variation of the opponent players’ strategy corresponds
a relatively small variation of the total power consumption in
(47). This comes from the definition of the condition number
of F, which is formally defined as the value of the asymptotic
worst-case relative change in the output for a relative change
in the input. Observe that Γ takes a finite value since F is a
smooth function.
V. ITERATIVE ALGORITHMS TO SOLVE G
In what follows, we show how to exploit the above theoret-
ical framework to compute the NE of G. Towards this goal,
two different solutions are proposed. The first one exploits
the equivalence between G and QVI(S,F), and show how the
solution of G can be computed by resorting to an iterative
method for solving QVIs. As we shall see, this results into
an iterative procedure that, in principle, requires a centralized
implementation. The second approach relies on showing that
QVI(S,F) is equivalent to a nonlinear complementary prob-
lem (NCP), which gives each player the possibility to reach
the NE of G in a distributed manner without the need for any
centralized processing.
A. A sequential penalty approach
The solution to G is next numerically obtained through
the iterative procedure for solving QVIs known as sequential
penalty approach (SPA) (e.g., see [23]). The latter is inspired
by the augmented Lagrangian approach for nonlinear program-
ming and its key idea is to solve the QVI by iteratively solving
a properly defined sequence of penalized VIs on the set P .
Specifically, let j be the iteration index and let {ρ(j)} ⊂ R+
be a sequence of given positive scalars satisfying ρ(j) < ρ(j+1)
and tending to ∞, i.e.,
lim
j→∞
ρ(j) →∞. (48)
Let also {α(j)} ⊂ RK be a sequence of some arbitrary
vectors, and denote by p(j) the solution of the following
penalized VI(j)(P ,F+∇C) on the set P :
(p− p(j))T
(
F(p(j)) +∇p(j)C(p(j))
)
≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P (49)
where ∇p(j)C(p(j)) = {∇p(j)k Ck(p
(j))}Kk=1 is the penalty
mapping at the jth iteration, with
Ck(p
(j)) =
KE
k
2ρ(j)
([
α
(j)
k + ρ
(j)gk
(
p
(j)
k ,p
(j)
−k
)]+)2
. (50)
The resulting iterative procedure is reported in Algorithm 2
and its convergence properties are stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 8. Let p(j) being the solution of (49) at iteration
j. If {α(j)} is a bounded sequence of vectors, i.e.,
max
k
∣∣∣α(j)k ∣∣∣ < α¯ ∀j (51)
with α¯ some non-negative real-valued number, then
pSPA = lim
j→∞
p(j) (52)
is a solution of QVI(S,F) and thus of G.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E and exploits
the more general result provided by [23, Theorem 3] which,
in turn, requires to prove that gk(pk,p−k) is a continuous
function with respect to the entire power vector p.
As seen, each iteration of Algorithm 2 requires only to solve
a penalized VI. Next, we briefly illustrate how this can be
done using standard optimization techniques. Let us introduce
a slack variable λ(j)k such that λ
(j)
k = 0 if k ∈ KR and
0 ≤ λ(j)k ⊥ (λ(j)k − α(j)k − ρ(j)gk(p(j)k ,p(j)−k)) ≥ 0 (53)
8Algorithm 3: Distributed algorithm for solving QVI(S,F)
Data. Set j = 0, γ(0) = 0K andΦ(γ(0)) = 0K . Choose ϵ≪ 1.
Step 1. Use γ(j) to compute pVI(γ(j)) solving
(p− pVI(γ(j)))T
(
F(pVI(γ(j))) + γ(j)
)
≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P
using the IWFP (e.g., via Algorithm 4).
Step 2. Use pVI(γ(j)) to compute t⋆k(pVI−k(γ(j))) for any k ∈ KE
via the Dinkelbach method (e.g., via Algorithm 1).
Step 3. Use pVIk (γ(j)) and t⋆k(pVI−k(γ(j))) to set[
Φ(γ(j))
]
k
=
1
t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ(j)))
−Ψk − 1TpVIk (γ(j))
for any k ∈ KE .
Step 4. If maxk
∣∣∣γ(j)k [Φ(γ(j))]
k
∣∣∣ ≤ ϵ, then return
p⋆ = pVI(γ(j)) and STOP, otherwise go to Step 5.
Step 5. Choose τ (j) > 0. Set
γ
(j+1)
k =
[
γ
(j)
k − τ (j)
[
Φ(γ(j))
]
k
]+
for any k ∈ KE .
Step 6. Set j ← j + 1; and go back to Step 1.
if k ∈ KE . From the KKT conditions of (49) and observing
that the squared max function (50) is once continuously
differentiable with[
∇
p
(j)
k
Ck(p
(j))
]
n
=
[
α
(j)
k + ρ
(j)gk
(
p
(j)
k ,p
(j)
−k
)]+
(54)
it follows that p(j) is the solution of VI(j)(P ,F + ∇C) if
and only if there exist some vectors µ(j) ∈ RK+ such that the
following stationarity condition is satisfied for any k:
Fk(p
(j)
k ,p
(j)
−k) + λ
(j)
k 1N + µ
(j)
k 1N = 0N (55)
with 0 ≤ µ(j)k ⊥ hk(p(j)k ) ≤ 0 and λ(j)k defined above.
Moreover, for any given λ(j) = [λ(j)1 ,λ
(j)
2 , . . . ,λ
(j)
K ]
T and
µ(j), the vector p(j) solving (55) can be easily found in closed
form as a function of λ(j) and µ(j). Therefore, the solution of
the jth iteration can be obtained solving a constrained system
of equations in λ(j) and µ(j). This can be done using standard
methods for nonsmooth continuous equations [29, Chapter 8].
In general, the implementation of Algorithm 2 requires
a centralized unit or an excessive exchange of information
among the users. Although possible, this is clearly not suited
for those applications (such as small-cell networks) wherein
the exchange of information among the users is unreliable or
even impossible. For this reason, in what follows we propose
an alternative solution, which operates in a distributed manner
and requires only local information.
B. An NCP-based approach
Assume that γ ∈ RK+ is a given vector and denote pVI(γ)
as the solution of the following penalized VI:
(p− pVI(γ))T (F(pVI(γ)) + γ) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P . (56)
Algorithm 4: Sequential IWFP for a given γ(j) ≽ 0
Data. Setm = 0 and choose any ξ(0)k ∈ Pk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
Step 1. Sequentially for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K compute
ξ
(m)
k = wfk
(
ξ
(m)
−k ,χ
(m)
k + γ
(j)
k
)
where wfk is defined as in (7), and χ
(m)
k is chosen to satisfy
the power constraint 1TKξ
(m)
k = Pk if
1TKwfk
(
ξ
(m)
−k , γ
(j)
k
)
≥ Pk
and χ(m)k = 0 otherwise.
Step 2. If a suitable termination criterion is satisfied, then
pVI(γ(j)) = ξ(m) and STOP, otherwise go to Step 3.
Step 3. Set m← m+ 1; and go back to Step 1.
Let us also define the mapping Φ : RK+ → RK as
[Φ(γ)]k =
{
0 if k ∈ KR
1
t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ))
−Ψk − 1TpVIk (γ) if k ∈ KE
(57)
with t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ)) being obtained via (18)-(20) after replacing
p−k with pVI−k(γ). Then, the following result can be proven.
Proposition 9. A power allocation profile p⋆ is an NE of G
if it solves (56) and γ is solution of the NCP(Φ) given by:
NCP(Φ) : 0 ≤ γ⊥ Φ(γ) ≥ 0. (58)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix F and relies on
showing that the solution of NCP(Φ) along with the solution
of the penalized VI satisfies the KKT of QVI(S,F), and thus
p⋆ is also an NE point of G.
Taking advantage of the above proposition, we develop the
iterative scheme illustrated in Algorithm 3, which operates
through a 2-layer procedure. More in details, at the jth
iteration the inner layer represented by Step 1 makes use of
γ(j) to compute the solution of (56). This is achieved using the
iterative waterfilling with pricing (IWFP) procedure proposed
in [14] and reported in Algorithm 4 for completeness. The
outer layer makes use of pVIk (γ
(j)) (provided by Step 1) to
update γ(j) through Steps 2 – 5. The convergence properties of
Algorithm 3 are stated in the following proposition, in which
{τ (j)} represent the scalar parameters used in Step 5.
Proposition 10. Assume that:
• The matrix B defined in (40) is positive definite;
• The mapping Φ(γ) is a co-coercive function of γ with
constant κ > 0, i.e.,
(γ1 − γ2)T (Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)) ≥ κ ∥Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)∥2
(59)
for any γ1, γ2 ∈ RK+ .
If the scalars τ (j) are chosen such that
0 ≤ inf
j
τ (j) ≤ sup
j
τ (j) ≤ 2κ (60)
9then the sequence of vectors {pVI(γ(j))} generated by Algo-
rithm 3 converges to the NE of G.
Proof: The convergence of the inner layer to the solution
of (56) follows from the results in [14], in which the authors
prove that if the mapping F is strongly monotone then pVI(γ)
can be computed in a distributed manner for any given γ ≽ 0
through IWFP. As pointed out in Appendix D, the condition
on the strong monotonicity of F holds true whenever the
matrix B in (40) is positive definite. On the other hand,
the convergence of the outer layer can be proved by simply
observing that it is equivalent to the projection method with
variable steps described in [29, Algorithm 12.1.4]. Therefore,
the convergence proof follows from [29, Theorem 12.1.8].
Unlike Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3 enables the computation
of the NE points of G in a distributed manner without the
need for any centralized processing. To see how this comes
about, observe that the evaluation of pVIk (γ
(j)) through IWFP
in the inner layer only requires knowledge of the local measure
of the overall interference plus noise. This information can
easily be estimated at each transmitter during its own reception
phase. The same information is needed in the outer layer
by each player k for updating the value of t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ
(j))) in
Step 2. Once t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ
(j))) is computed, then
[
Φ(γ(j))
]
k
is
evaluated in Step 3 and later used in Step 5 to update γ(j+1)k .
Remark 5 (On the design of {τ (j)} in Algorithm 3). From
(60), it follows that a judicious design of {τ (j)} would require
to compute κ in closed form as a function of the system
parameters. Unfortunately, this is a challenging task, which is
still much open. In Appendix G, we make use of some heuristic
arguments to conjecture that if the uniqueness conditions of
Theorem 3 are satisfied, then Φ(γ) is a co-coercive function
of γ with constant
κ =
β
1 + Γ−2
(61)
where
β =
λmin(B˜)
max
k
max
n
{(ς˜k(n))2} (62)
is the strong monotonicity constant of F while Γ is its
condition number (see also Appendix D). A formal proof of
(61) is beyond the scope of this work, and it is currently under
investigation. Herewith, we observe that, although building
upon heuristics, this condition has been validated by means
of the extensive simulations shown in the next section. In
particular, it turns out that the proposed distributed algorithm
converges with probability one whenever the uniqueness con-
ditions depicted in Theorem 3 are satisfied.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical results are now provided to assess the perfor-
mance of the proposed solutions when applied to a hetero-
geneous network. In particular, we consider a scenario with
K = 8 players in which four of them aim at maximizing the
EE and the other four are focused on the SE maximization. The
system parameters are as follows: i) the interference channel is
composed of N = 16 subchannels; ii) the channel coefficients
P c
Fig. 2: Convergence probability of Algorithm 3.
Hk,i(n) are assumed to be CN (0, 1) ∀k, i, n; iii) the average
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on the generic subchannel n over
link k is defined as SNRk(n) = E{|Hk,k(n)|2}/σ2k and it
is set to 0 dB ∀k, n; iv) the maximum normalized power is
fixed to Pk = N for any k; v) the static power consumption
is assumed to be Ψk = 1 for all k; vi) the starting point
of the distributed algorithms is the uniform power allocation
strategy, i.e., p(0)k = 1; vii) the tolerance parameter of the
Dinkelbach’s algorithm is set to ϵ = 10−6, viii) the sequence
{τ (j)} is chosen such that the upper bound in (60) is met with
equality with κ given by (61).
Fig. 2 shows the empirical probability that Algorithm 3
converges to the solution of the QVI obtained via Algorithm
2. The convergence probability Pc is plotted as a function
of the average signal to interference ratio (SIR) on the
generic subchannel n over link k defined as SIRk(n) =
E{|Hk,k(n)|2}/(
∑
i̸=k E{|Hk,i(n)|2}). As it is seen, in the
low SIR regime Algorithm 3 does not always converge to the
solution of the QVI and thus to the NE point of G. This is
because the co-coercivity of Φ is not guaranteed for small
values of SIRs. On the other hand, the convergence probability
is numerically close to one for moderate-to-high values of SIR.
Figs. 3-4 show respectively the EE and the SE dynamics
during the time interval needed by Algorithm 3 to converge.
As can seen, a stable power allocation strategy is achieved
while enhancing the EE of the energy efficient users up to the
113% with respect to static uniform power allocation at the
price of a consistent information rate loss. The equilibrium
is also achieved for the SE users with a final SE more than
doubled with respect the initial uniform power allocation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have studied a non-cooperative game
modelling the power allocation problem that arises in a
heterogenous multipoint-to-multipoint network wherein each
TRP can arbitrarily choose whether to selfishly maximize its
own SE or EE. To overcome the main limitations of existing
methodologies, we have reformulated the underlying game as
a QVI problem and then we have exploited the powerful tools
of the QVI theory: i) to study the uniqueness of the NE points;
and ii) to derive novel algorithms to converge to the NE points
in an iterative manner both with and without the need for
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Fig. 4: Spectral efficiency dynamics when SIRk(n) = 3 dB.
a centralized processing. Numerical results have been used
to validate the performance of the proposed solutions in a
heterogeneous network.
This work must be considered as a first attempt in using the
QVI theory for dealing with EE in a competitive environment.
We do believe that the developed framework will be of great
help to deal with several interesting extensions (as the VI the-
ory was useful to better study the rate maximization problem).
For example, the above results might be in principle extended
to any t⋆k(p−k) that is a continuously differentiable function
of the set of other players’ powers p−k. This means that any
additional constraint in (15) or (25) could be easily handled
by QVI(S,F) whenever it can be incorporated in t⋆k(p−k).
This might be the case of minimum data rate requirement or
maximum allowed interference levels.
Another interesting result that builds upon the developed
framework is as follows. Exploiting the well-established re-
lationship between QVIs and generalized NE problems (e.g.,
see [23], [30]), the heterogeneous game G turns out to be
equivalent to G′ = ⟨K, {Sk}, {Rk}⟩ in which the problem to
be solved for each player k takes the form:
max
pk
Rk(pk,p−k) (63)
subject to pk ∈ Sk(p−k).
This means that a heterogeneous game G in which each player
can choose whether to maximize its own SE or EE is basically
equivalent to a game G′ in which the utility to maximize is
always the rate but the strategy set of each player depends on
the opponents’ strategies p−k through Sk(p−k). This result
may be useful to get valuable insights into the tradeoff between
SE and EE in competitive environments.
APPENDIX A
PROBLEM (15) AS A FRACTIONAL PROGRAM
In this appendix, the solution of (15) is computed by means
of the parameter-free convex fractional program approach
(e.g., see [17]). To this end, we set
yk =
pk
Ψk + 1Tpk
(64)
and define tk as the inverse of the total power dissipation
tk =
1
Ψk + 1Tpk
. (65)
Then, the kth maximization problem in (15) can be rewritten
in the following parameter-free form:
max
{yk,tk}∈RN+1+
tkRk(yk/tk,p−k) (66)
subject to tk(Ψk + 1
Tyk/tk) ≤ 1
1Tyk/tk − Pk ≤ 0
which is equivalent to (15), since the inequality in the first
constraint can be changed to an equality if the denominator of
the EE function is affine, and it is convex in (yk, tk), since the
perspective of a function preserves convexity [31]. To proceed
further, let us define the slack vector zk = yk/tk and denote
by νk and µk the dual variables associated with the constraints
tk(Ψk + 1
T zk) − 1 ≤ 0 and 1T zk − Pk ≤ 0. Let us also
denote t⋆k(p−k) the optimum value of tk when the constraint
1T zk−Pk ≤ 0 on the maximum transmit power is neglected.
The KKT conditions of (66) yield
z⋆k = wfk(p−k, ν
⋆
k + µ
⋆
k) (67)
where the waterfilling operator is defined as in (7). Now,
it is worth observing that Rk(zk,p−k) is a monotonically
increasing function of zk(n) for any n. It follows that, at
the optimum point, either the first or the second constraint
in (66) are satisfied with equality. Hence, from (67), using
the complementary slackness conditions it follows that, if
1/t⋆k(p−k) − Ψk ≤ Pk , then µ⋆k = 0, whereas ν⋆k ̸= 0 and
such that
1Twfk(p−k, ν⋆k) =
1
t⋆k(p−k)
−Ψk. (68)
On the other hand, if 1/t⋆k(p−k) − Ψk > Pk, then ν⋆k = 0
whereas µ⋆k ̸= 0 and such that 1Twfk(p−k, µ⋆k) = Pk.
Consequently, it turns out that z⋆k has the following waterfilling
structure:
z⋆k = wfk(p−k,λ
⋆
k) (69)
where λ⋆k must satisfy the power constraint
1T z⋆k = min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p−k)
−Ψk
}
. (70)
Recalling that z⋆k = y
⋆
k/t
⋆
k, from (64) and (65) the results (16)
and (17) easily follow.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We start observing that gk(pk,p−k) in (28) is convex and
continuously differentiable with respect to pk for any possible
vector p−k ∈ P−k. Therefore, we can make use of [22,
Theorem 1] and state that p⋆ is a solution of QVI(Q,F) if
and only if there exist some vectors ν⋆ ∈ RK+ and µ⋆ ∈ RK+
satisfying the following KKT conditions for any k 2:
Fk
(
p⋆k,p
⋆
−k
)
+ ν⋆k1N + µ
⋆
k1N = 0N (71)
with
0 ≤ ν⋆k ⊥ gk
(
p⋆k,p
⋆
−k
) ≤ 0 (72)
0 ≤ µ⋆k ⊥ hk (p⋆k) ≤ 0. (73)
From (71) – (73), using (2) and (28), we can easily verify that
p⋆ is thus a solution of QVI(Q,F) if and only if
p⋆k = wfk(p
⋆
−k,λ
⋆
k) (74)
with λ⋆k being such that
1Twfk(p
⋆
−k,λ
⋆
k) = min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p
⋆
−k)
−Ψk
}
. (75)
The above condition coincides exactly with the condition for
an NE in GE as stated in Proposition 3. This means that p⋆
is also an NE of GE .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Let us consider the following problem:
z⋆k = ΠQk(p−k)
⎛⎝−ξk −∑
i̸=k
Dk,ipi
⎞⎠ (76)
which corresponds to the Euclidean projection of the vector
−ξk −
∑
i̸=kDk,ipi onto the simplex Qk(p−k) defined as in
(33). Mathematically, z⋆k is computed looking for the solution
of the following minimization problem:
z⋆k = argminzk
1
2
∥∥∥zk − (−ξk −∑
i̸=k
Dk,ipi
)∥∥∥2 (77)
subject to zk ∈ Qk(p−k)
which is in a convex form for any given p−k. Therefore, the
associated Lagrangian is
L(zk,νk,θk) = 1
2
N∑
n=1
(zk(n) + ζk(n))
2
− θk
(
N∑
n=1
zk(n)−min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p−k)
−Ψk
})
−
N∑
n=1
νk(n)zk(n) (78)
2Observe that, according to [22], the gradient of the constraint functions,
gk(·, ·) for any k in (71), are computed only with respect to the first argument
pk , while the second argument is kept as a constant. Hence, we have
∇pkgk(pk ,p−k) = 1N .
with ζk(n) = ξk(n) +
∑
i̸=k
Dk,i(n)pi(n), and the problem
solution z⋆k is such that the following KKT conditions are
satisfied for any n:
z⋆k(n) + ζk(n)− θ⋆k − ν⋆k(n) = 0 (79)
z⋆k(n) ≥ 0 ν⋆k(n) ≥ 0 ν⋆k(n)z⋆k(n) = 0 (80)
N∑
n=1
z⋆k(n) = min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p−k)
−Ψk
}
. (81)
From (79) and (80), if z⋆k(n) > 0, we obtain
z⋆k(n) = θ
⋆
k − ζk(n) > 0 (82)
with ζk(n) > 0. Thus, θ⋆k > 0 whenever z
⋆
k(n) > 0. On the
other hand, if z⋆k(n) = 0, we get
−ν⋆k(n) = θ⋆k − ζk(n) ≤ 0. (83)
Finally, from (81) – (83) we obtain
z⋆k(n) = [θ
⋆
k − ζk(n)]+ (84)
with θ⋆k being such that
1T z⋆k = min
{
Pk,
1
t⋆k(p−k)
−Ψk
}
. (85)
Setting θ⋆k = 1/λ
⋆
k, it follows that (84) and (85) are
equivalent to (69) and (70), respectively. This means that the
parameter-free optimization problem in (66) is equivalent to
the minimization problem in (77). Since the optimal power
allocation profile p⋆k of player k is always an instance of z
⋆
k,
it follows that p⋆ is a NE of the energy-efficient maximization
problem if and only if it is such that:
p⋆ = ΠQ(p⋆)
⎛⎝−ξk −∑
i̸=k
Dk,ipi
⎞⎠ . (86)
The claim of Proposition 5 is thus proved.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The uniqueness result of Theorem 3 is a consequence
of the following theorem [28, Theorem 4.1] (see also [32,
Theorem 9]).
Theorem 4. Let the following assumptions hold.
• The operator F is strongly monotone ∀p,p′ ∈ P , i.e.,
(p− p′)T (F(p)− F(p′)) ≥ β ∥p− p′∥2 (87)
with β > 0 being the strong monotonicity constant;
• The operator F is Lipschitz continuous ∀p,p′ ∈ P with
modulus L > 0, i.e.,
∥F(p)− F(p′)∥ ≤ L ∥p− p′∥ ; (88)
• There exists a constant δ ≥ 0 such that ∀z,p,p′ ∈ P∥∥ΠS(p)(z) −ΠS(p′)(z)∥∥ ≤ δ ∥p− p′∥
with δ < β/L.
Then, QVI(S,F) has a unique solution.
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The first condition easily follows from [14, Proposition 2]
in which it is stated that if B in (40) is positive definite then
the operator F is strongly monotone ∀p,p′ ∈ P with
β =
λmin(B˜)
max
k
max
n
{(ς˜k(n))2} (89)
where B˜ represent the symmetric part of B and
ς˜k(n) =
σ2k(n)
|Hk,k(n)|2 +
∑
i
|Hk,i(n)|2
|Hk,k(n)|2Pi. (90)
To prove that F is Lipschitz continuous, we make use of (10)
to get
∥Fk(p)− Fk(p′)∥ ≤∥∥∥∥∥∥
{
−
∑K
i=1Dk,i(n)pi(n)−
∑K
i=1Dk,i(n)p
′
i(n)
ξ2k(n)
}N
n=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
(91)
since ξk(n) +
∑K
i=1Dk,i(n)pi(n) ≥ ξk(n). Letting A˜k,i be a
diagonal matrix with elements[
A˜k,i
]
n,n
=
Dk,i(n)
ξ2k(n)
=
|Hk,i(n)|2 |Hk,k(n)|2
σ4k(n)
(92)
from (91) we obtain
∥Fk(p)− Fk(p′)∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
A˜k,i (pi − p′i)
∥∥∥∥∥ . (93)
Observe now that∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
A˜k,i (pi − p′i)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
K∑
i=1
max
n
{[
A˜k,i
]
n,n
}
∥pi − p′i∥
(94)
so that from (93) one gets
∥Fk(p)− Fk(p′)∥ ≤
K∑
i=1
[A]k,i ∥pi − p′i∥ (95)
with A being defined as in (39). Then, we may write
∥F(p)− F(p′)∥2 ≤
K∑
k=1
(
K∑
i=1
[A]k,i ∥pi − p′i∥
)2
(96)
or, equivalently,
∥F(p)− F(p′)∥2 ≤ ∥Ax∥2 (97)
where
x = [∥p1 − p′1∥ , · · · , ∥pK − p′K∥]T . (98)
Observe that
∥Ax∥ ≤ ∥A∥ ∥x∥ = ∥A∥ ∥p− p′∥ (99)
with ∥A∥ = max∥x∥=1 {∥Ax∥} =
√
λmax(AHA) being the
induced norm of matrix AHA. Therefore, we may write
∥F(p)− F(p′)∥ ≤
√
λmax(AHA) ∥p− p′∥ (100)
which proves that F is Lipschitz continuous ∀p,p′ ∈ P with
modulus L =
√
λmax(AHA).
We now proceed proving that the second condition of
Theorem 3 holds true if (42) is satisfied. To this end, we start
observing that∥∥ΠS(p)(z)−ΠS(p′)(z)∥∥2 =∑
k∈KE
∥∥∥ΠSk(p−k)(zk)−ΠSk(p′−k)(zk)∥∥∥2 . (101)
Since the upper boundaries of Sk(p−k) and Sk(p′−k), denoted
with Sk(p−k) and Sk(p′−k) respectively, are two parallel
hyperplanes in pk, i.e. either Sk(p−k) ⊂ Sk(p′−k) or
Sk(p′−k) ⊆ Sk(p−k), we may write∑
k∈KE
∥∥∥ΠSk(p−k)(zk)−ΠSk(p′−k)(zk)∥∥∥2 ≤∑
k∈KE
∥∥∥ΠSk(p−k)(zk)−ΠSk(p′−k)(zk)∥∥∥2 . (102)
Observing that∑
k∈KE
∥∥∥ΠSk(p−k)(zk)−ΠSk(p′−k)(zk)∥∥∥2 ≤
≤
∑
k∈KE
(
1
tk(p′−k)
− 1
tk(p−k)
)2
= ∥Ω(p)−Ω(p′)∥2
and using (101) and (102) yields∥∥ΠS(p)(z)−ΠS(p′)(z)∥∥2 ≤ ∥Ω(p)−Ω(p′)∥2
from which taking into account (42) we eventually obtain∥∥ΠS(p)(z)−ΠS(p′)(z)∥∥ ≤ δ ∥p− p′∥ (103)
as required by the second condition of Theorem 3.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
The proof of Proposition 8 follows from the more general
result provided by [23, Theorem 3], according to which
the SPA leads to the solution of a generic QVI(S,F) with
S (p) = ∏Kk=1 Sk(p−k), and Sk(p−k) defined as in (35), if
the following conditions are satisfied:
• F is continuous in p and hk(pk) is continuously differ-
entiable and convex in pk;
• gk(pk,p−k) is continuously differentiable and convex in
pk;
• gk(pk,p−k) is continuous in p.
From (2) and (10), it follows that the first condition is verified
for the problem at hand. The second condition is also met
since gk(pk,p−k) in (28) is an affine function of pk for
any given p−k. Therefore, we are only left with proving
that gk(pk,p−k) is continuous in p. From (28), this amounts
to showing that t⋆k(p−k) is continuous ∀p−k ∈ P−k with
P−k =
∏
i̸=k Pi. This is proved by contradiction as follows.
Assume that there exists a pair of arbitrary sequences {z(j)1 },
{z(j)2 } with z(j)1 , z(j)2 ∈ RN(K−1), ∀j such that
lim
j→∞
z
(j)
1 = p−k
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and
lim
j→∞
z
(j)
2 = p−k
with
lim
j→∞
t⋆k(z
(j)
1 ) ̸= lim
j→∞
t⋆k(z
(j)
2 ). (104)
From (18) – (19), this implies that there exist two distinct
values of the Lagrangian multiplier ν⋆k , namely, ν
⋆
k,1 and ν
⋆
k,2,
such that the condition (20) is fulfilled. At the same time, from
(20) it follows that any instance of ν⋆k is such that
ν⋆k =
Rk (zk(ν
⋆
k),p−k)
Ψk + 1T zk(ν⋆k)
(105)
which is nothing else than the maximum value of the EE
function Ek(pk,p−k) = tkRk(pk,p−k) in (23). Since
Ek(pk,p−k) is strictly quasiconcave [19], it follows that ν⋆k
must be unique. Accordingly, we must conclude that there
are no distinct sequences {z(j)1 } and {z(j)2 } such that (104) is
satisfied. This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
We start observing that p⋆ is a solution of QVI(S,F) if and
only if there exist some vectors ν⋆ ∈ RK+ and µ⋆ ∈ RK+ such
that the following KKT conditions are satisfied [22], [23]:
Fk(p
⋆) + ν⋆k1N + µ
⋆
k1N = 0N (106)
0 ≤ µ⋆k ⊥ hk(p⋆k) ≤ 0 (107)
with ν⋆k = 0 if k ∈ KR, and
0 ≤ ν⋆k ⊥ gk(p⋆k,p⋆−k) ≤ 0 (108)
if k ∈ KE . Next, we look for a procedure that allows to
compute a triplet (p⋆,ν⋆,µ⋆) in a distributed manner. To this
end, we observe that the solution pVI(γ) of (56) must be such
that there exists some vector χ⋆ ∈ RK+ satisfying
Fk(p
VI(γ)) + γk1N + χ
⋆
k1N = 0N (109)
0 ≤ χ⋆k ⊥ hk(pVIk (γ)) ≤ 0. (110)
Let γ⋆ be the solution of the following nonlinear comple-
mentarity problem NCP(Φ), with Φ defined as in (57):
find γ ≽ 0 (111)
subject to Φ(γ) ≽ 0
0 ≤ γ⊥ Φ(γ) ≥ 0.
We can easily see that the triplet (pVI(γ⋆),γ⋆,χ⋆) satisfies the
KKT conditions of QVI(S,F) (see also [29] for more details
on finite-dimensional VIs and complementarity problems).
APPENDIX G
According to Proposition 10, the main condition for the
convergence of the proposed algorithm is the co-coercivity of
the operator Φ, i.e., there exists a constant κ such that
(γ1−γ2)T (Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)) ≥ κ ∥Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)∥2 (112)
where, from (38) and (57), we can observe that
(γ1 − γ2)T (Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)) =
= (γ1 − γ2)T (Ω(pVI(γ1))−Ω(pVI(γ2)))
−
K∑
k=1
(γ1,k − γ2,k)(1TpVI(γ1)− 1TpVI(γ2)). (113)
Let us assume that the uniqueness conditions presented in
Theorem 3 are fulfilled and consider the right side of (112).
Exploiting the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we may write
∥Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)∥2 ≤
∥Ω(p(γ1))−Ω(p(γ2))∥2 +
∥∥pVI(γ1)− pVI(γ2)∥∥2 (114)
where, from (42), one gets
∥Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)∥2 ≤
δ2
∥∥pVI(γ1)− pVI(γ2)∥∥2 + ∥∥pVI(γ1)− pVI(γ2)∥∥2 =(
1 + Γ−2
) ∥∥pVI(γ1)− pVI(γ2)∥∥2 (115)
with Γ = L/β. To proceed further, we take advantage of the
results in [14, Proposition 8] wherein it is proved that
−
K∑
k=1
(γ1,k − γ2,k)(1TpVI(γ1)− 1TpVI(γ2)) ≥
β
∥∥pVI(γ1)− pVI(γ2)∥∥2 ≥ β1 + Γ−2 ∥Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)∥2 .
(116)
At this point, we are only left with the scalar product:
(γ1 − γ2)T
[
Ω(pVI(γ1))−Ω(pVI(γ2))
]
=
K∑
k=1
(γ1,k − γ2,k)
(
1
t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ1))
− 1
t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ2))
)
. (117)
From (18), one gets
[Ω(pVI(γ))]k =
1
t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ))
−Ψk = 1Twfk(pVI−k(γ), ν⋆k)
which represents the radiated power we would have at the
transmitter k when the EE is maximized given pVI−k(γ). The
lack of an explicit form for t⋆k(p
VI
−k(γ)) makes it hard to study
in a rigorous way the co-coercivity of (Ω(pVI(γ)) with respect
to γ. To partially fulfill this lack, the following heuristic line
of reasoning is used to get some insights. Intuitively speaking,
when the penalty coefficients in γ increase, the interfering
powers in pVI−k(γ) decrease and the user k experiences larger
SINRs. According to the waterfilling principle, a larger SINR
implies a larger radiated power, or, in other words,
(γ1 − γ2)T (Ω(pVI(γ1))−Ω(pVI(γ2))) ≥ 0. (118)
Then, collecting (113) and (115)-(116), one gets
(γ1−γ2)T (Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)) ≥
β
1 + Γ−2
∥Φ(γ1)−Φ(γ2)∥2 .
(119)
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